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10 March 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on 2 March 1995**

1. The attendees included: Berger, Vershow, and Kerrick from NSC; Deutch and Slocombe from the Department of Defense; Tarnoff, Frasure, and Holbrooke from State; Fuerth and Saunders from the Office of the Vice President; Schefer from US/UN, Clarke and Christman from JCS; Adams for OMB, and MacEachin and myself for CIA.

Prepositioning for UN Withdrawal

2. Berger started the discussion by framing the question: should the US government decide now on prepositioning, or wait until there is an extraction plan to examine?

3. General Clarke said prepositioning made a lot of sense from the military perspective. The Military Committee at NATO was working behind the scenes. AFSOUTH is reexamining the plan and may revise the numbers involved in Phase 2 prepositioning. He added that supplying the communications officers for Phase 2 makes no commitment regarding our eventual participation. Waiting too long could render a feasible extraction plan infeasible. Deutch argued that the Hill should be told this is a contingency only and that prepositioning is reversible. In response to a question from Tarnoff, Deutch said if Tudjman agreed to a three-month extension of the mandate, he would withdraw the communicators.

4. On behalf of prepositioning, Fuerth noted that the US has accepted responsibility to withdraw UNPROFOR. Without this precaution, the US would be gambling with the lives of other nations' troops.

5. Tarnoff responded that a key consideration is how prepositioning would affect Croatian President Tudjman. A mission to extract UNPROFOR would put US forces in a dramatically different position than before. In particular, if war breaks out, it will be difficult for NATO only to withdraw UNPROFOR without playing any other role. The effects of prepositioning on the Serbs and Krajina Serbs is negative and it could inadvertently provoke precipitous actions by them. Finally, he argued this is a hard political sell in the US.

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6. Holbrooke also argued that this would be a tough sell on the Hill. Basically the Administration would be asking Congress to appropriate a large sum of money for an operation to extract UN troops that will lead to the worst war in Europe since 1945. In addition, the US would be asked later to help pick up some of the humanitarian costs from this renewed war. He also wondered whether the US was letting logistics drive its policy on this matter. [redacted]

7. Berger wondered what alternatives there are if the US fails to persuade Tudjman to renew the mandate. Holbrooke said the consequences are so horrible, it was impossible to conceive of failing. Tarnoff noted it is incumbent to keep the President informed on the necessity of performing an extraction and more will be known next week. [redacted]

8. Adams of OMB asked whether it was possible to wait to decide, for example, until the end of March, when the situation is clearer. Clarke felt waiting was militarily risky because whenever the warring parties sense UNPROFOR is about to leave they are likely to react before the extraction force arrives. [redacted]

Bosnia and Contact Group

9. Holbrooke reported on the Contact Group meeting after the British, French, and Germans representatives met with Milosevic. Everyone was upset at the Russian representative Zotov. The British were characterized as anxious to do anything that will bring peace. The French thought Milosevic had made a few interesting points, but not enough to have much hope. Milosevic promised a paper on his ideas. If the Contact Group finds anything interesting, it will meet again next week and go to Sarajevo and Belgrade. [redacted]

Croatia and the UN Mandate

10. Holbrooke said that he planned to tell Tudjman he is at a crossroads where he can decide between war and peace. If he chooses war, the US will isolate him and begin an escalating set of measures to sever ties. If he selects peace, he will find increasing cooperation from the EU and US. [redacted]

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11. Holbrooke reported that Galbraith had met with Croatian Defense Minister Susak. Susak had identified the minimum conditions: change the name of UNPROFOR; the remaining group should have a separate command from Akashi; there had to be a new Security Council resolution; there has to be some presence on the international border; and monitors must be installed at some twenty points on the international border. [redacted]

12. The Deputies had further discussions on the nature of Holbrooke's mission to Zagreb. Berger wondered whether Holbrooke should only go to listen or whether he should specify the carrots and sticks. Slocombe argued that identifying the sticks might help persuade Tudjman. Holbrooke reiterated that not everything would be resolved in this next meeting; rather it would begin negotiations. He mentioned again the possibility of not letting Tudjman come to Washington for the commemoration of the one-year anniversary of the Federation unless he agrees to a three-month extension of the mandate and approves the concept of an interpositional force. Tarnoff noted that the potential US sticks are not nearly as heavy as those the EU can wield. State was tasked with a paper on approaching Tudjman about the carrots and sticks for consideration by the Principals. [redacted]

Bottom-up Review of Policy

13. Berger agreed to schedule an informal Saturday meeting of the Deputies to discuss the basic policy options. [redacted] 2

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Ray Converse
Deputy Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

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